United States from the Philippines in March 1996. Studies were initiated in the Philippines to identify the source of the virus among monkey-breeding and export facilities, to establish surveillance and testing, and to assess the risk and significance of EBO-R infections in humans who work in these facilities. Over a 5-month period, acutely infected animals were found at only one facility, as determined using Ebola antigen detection. Three of 1732 monkeys and 1 of 246 animal handlers tested had detectable antibodies; all were from the same facility, which was the source of infected monkeys imported to the United States. Virus transmission, which was facilitated by poor infectioncontrol practices, continued for several months in one facility and was stopped only when the facility was depopulated. None of the 246 employees of the facilities or 4 contacts of previously antibodypositive individuals reported an Ebola-like illness. This investigation suggests that human EBO-R infection is rare.
Ebola (EBO) (subtype Reston [EBO-R]) virus was originally
animal was tested and found positive for EBO antigens [8] .
After another animal was confirmed to be EBO virus positive discovered in the United States in 1989 in association with an outbreak of viral hemorrhagic fever among cynomolgus by antigen virus isolation, and reverse transcription -polymerase chain reaction of EBO-R RNA, 50 animals, which constimonkeys (Macaca fascicularis) exported from the Philippines [1] . Subsequently, 4 other episodes of EBO-R virus infection tuted a quarantine cohort, of the 100 imported from the Philippines were destroyed [8] . The 8 employees in contact with the among monkeys imported from the Philippines have occurred in the United States and Italy between 1990 and 1992 [2] . In infected monkeys and the other 50 animals from the shipment were monitored but did not show any signs of illness or evieach instance, the hallmark of infection was rapid dissemination throughout the facility of a highly fatal infection in mondence of infection [8] . Sequence analysis of the glycoprotein gene of virus from the first EBO-R -infected monkey revealed keys. In contrast, limited studies of humans occupationally exposed to infected monkeys or their tissues suggested that a 98.9% nucleotide homology with the original 1989 EBO-R virus [9] . infection in humans is infrequent and asymptomatic or, at worst in these limited infections, associated with only a mild disease.
Following confirmation of the presence of EBO-R virus in these monkeys, the Philippine Department of Health placed a There have been 4 documented asymptomatic human infections in the United States [3, 4] and 3 antibody-positive individuals moratorium on the export and movement of monkeys within the Philippines, pending an investigation to explain the origin of identified in the Philippines [5] . Following the original episodes in 1989 -1990, the United States modified the procedures used infected animals, despite regulations that stipulate that all exported monkeys are captive-bred and must be quarantined for 45 in the transportation and quarantine of nonhuman primates to include mandatory disease control requirements [6] . Similarly, days prior to export. Herein, we report the results of that investigation and a parallel study of the risk and health significance of in 1994, the Republic of the Philippines banned the export of wild-caught monkeys and instituted other procedures (such as EBO-R infection in occupationally exposed humans. a 45-day quarantine prior to export) to obviate the potential for export of EBO-R -infected monkeys [7] . Methods In March 1996, a monkey imported from the Philippines died while in quarantine at a commercial facility in Texas; the Study sites. The Philippines is one of the world's major sources of purpose-bred cynomolgus monkeys for biomedical research. The five licensed breeding and export facilities provide an estimated 5000 captive-bred monkeys every year to the United States, Europe, and Japan. A small number of animals are also sold to lected within licensed wildlife trapping areas designated by the near wildlife trapping areas on the southern island of Mindanao serve as prequarantine stations where wild-caught monkeys sePhilippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources on lected as breeders are held prior to transfer to the breeding facilities the island of Mindanao; one facility utilizes only captive-bred (figure 1). animals for breeding stock, and the other has suspended export Surveillance for EBO-R disease in monkeys. In May 1996, operations but still has limited breeding stock. Holding facilities surveillance in monkeys was established at each of the five facilities to determine if any mortality was associated with EBO-R infection. The veterinary staff of the facilities was responsible for Table 1 . Description of the five facilities of the Primate Exporters the collection of liver specimens from all dead monkeys (including and Breeders Association of the Philippines, May 1996 (see figure 1 sacrificed moribund and sick ones), regardless of the perceived for map of locations). cause of illness. To limit dissemination, all monkeys in the same housing unit as EBO antigen-positive animals were euthanatized. initiated in an attempt to determine the source of the EBO-R. † Total population unknown.
Risk assessment on occupationally exposed humans. All employees of breeding and export facilities were interviewed. Data on possible risk factors for infection (i.e., bites or scratches from monkeys, handling of blood and other tissues) and history of any antigen except that an adjusted optical density of ú0.2 at 410 nm EBO-like illness (fever associated with hemorrhage, myalgias) was required for positive status for the dilution. Titers of §1:400 were gathered. Blood samples were collected and tested for EBOwere considered antibody positive. R IgG antibody by ELISA. Family contacts of previously identified antibody-positive persons (Miranda ME, unpublished data) were also interviewed, and blood samples were obtained for antibody from the other facilities were negative for EBO-R antigen.
Results

testing.
Surveillance for monkey disease and mortality caused by
Virginia [11, 12] . Sera were tested at dilutions of 1:100, 1:400, Antibody survey among monkeys. Three of the 301 animals 1:1600, and 1:6400 against both the EBO antigen and a negative sampled at Facility A were IgG antibody positive, which is antigen made from mock-infected cells prepared in a similar manindicative of previous EBO-R infection. All 3 animals were ner. Horseradish peroxidase-conjugated anti-human IgG (Fc speresampled a week later and were again found antibody positive.
cific) was used for humans and primates as a detector antibody. Antibody titers were calculated in a manner similar to that for These animals were resident in the hospital. Two were wild-/ 9d49$$se37 12-27-98 05:33:14 jinfa UC: J Infect dures used in the transportation and quarantine of nonhuman primates, including mandatory disease-control efforts, and they included EBO virus testing requirements [15] . This was done to strengthen infection control within quarantined primates and caught, and the other was born within the facility. All of the to reduce exposure risks to humans occupationally in contact remaining 1431 samples from the other four breeding and exwith the primates. The containment of transmission to a single port facilities and all holding facilities were negative for detectanimal cohort during the 1996 outbreak in the Texas quarantine able IgG antibody (table 3) .
facility [8] strongly supports the effectiveness of these regulaHuman studies. Two hundred fifty persons were included tions. These recent importations of EBO-R -infected monkeys in the study. One of 18 employees in Facility A was positive were detected while the animals were in quarantine, and, thus, for IgG antibody to EBO-R. No individuals from the other the potential for transmission was minimal to facility employfacilities had detectable antibody. The positive individual preees and other animals in the facility. Since August 1994, the viously had been identified as positive in 1992. A blood sample Philippines has banned the export of wild-caught monkeys and that was obtained from this persons's spouse was EBO-R antiintroduced additional safety measures, including a 45-day quarbody negative. Blood samples were also obtained from 3 family antine prior to export [7] . This episode suggests that there was members of another employee who was antibody positive in a lapse in procedure, since the quarantine in Facility A failed 1992 but who had no detectable EBO-R IgG antibody in 1996;  to pick up infected monkeys and did not prevent their export. the samples were antibody negative.
Five Filipino animal handlers have been found with EBO-R antibody. During the 1989-1990 study, using the indirect fluorescent antibody test with sera considered positive if the antiDiscussion body titer was §1:256, 3 individuals were determined to be antibody positive [5] . In 1993, 2 new EBO-R antibody-positive This investigation documents active serial transmission of EBO-R within a primate export facility in the Philippines. This individuals were detected, by use of the IgG antibody ELISA (Miranda ME and Ksiazek TG, unpublished data). All of these facility was the source of the 1996 importation of EBO-Rinfected monkeys into Texas, of infected monkeys from 3 of persons worked in Facility A, the source of the infected monkeys in 1989-1990 and 1992 . A sample from 1 of the 3 antibodythe 4 EBO-R outbreaks in the United States in 1989 -1990 , and of infected monkeys in Siena, Italy, in 1992 . The positive persons from the 1989-1990 study was retested in the current study and found to be negative. The other positive persons only other known source of EBO-R infected monkeys from the Philippines involved an illegal animal exporter in 1989 [6] .
were no longer working in the animal facility during the current study. In the present study, the IgG antibody ELISA was used. Results of antibody and antigen detection tests suggest that virus transmission was present only in Facility A. The constant One of the 2 people who were EBO-R IgG-positive during the 1992 study remained positive, while the other person was no detection of antigen-positive animals from the hospital and breeding cages confirms serial virus transmission in the facility.
longer antibody positive. This indicates that, as determined by our current ELISA technology, some antibody-positive persons The serial transmission of virus was attributed to the facility's poor husbandry and infection-control practices, including reuse may revert to undetectable antibody status through time.
Results of this and other investigations in the Philippines of needles, unrestricted movement of personnel into and out of infected housing units, damaged cages, which permitted and United States show that humans can be infected with the EBO-R virus [3 -5] . However, transmission to humans has some animals to escape and roam freely, and the high incidence of animal fighting in gang cages (due to directly connected been infrequent and did not result in any reported illness. This suggests that infection results in a very mild or inapparent cages housing at least 8 animals). This cage configuration was not observed in the other facilities. These same practices unillness and that EBO-R does not pose the same public health threat as the African EBO virus subtypes. doubtedly contributed to the higher overall mortality seen in Facility A, even when laboratory-confirmed EBO virus mortalAlthough we have confirmed the presence and transmission of EBO-R within Facility A, the source of the virus was not ity is removed.
